But the court initially found no direct evidence that the boat was sunk by one of its own torpedos.Īfter pieces of the Scorpion were recovered by the deep submersible Trieste II, a Technical Advisory Group of scientists and former submariners poured through physical evidence and SOSUS data and came up with a surprising fact - the Scorpion had been heading east, instead of west toward Norfolk, when the first cataclysmic explosion detonated. The danger was avoided when the boat expelled the torpedo before it could detonate.
In December 1967, the Scorpion had a problem when a Mark 37 torpedo accidently activated while in its tube. The court also considered the possibility that one of the boat's own torpedos had exploded. Moreover, by the time of her last report, there was no other Soviet or Warsaw-Pact, plus the panel concluded that the Echo, which was designed for launching missiles while surfaced, would not have been a match for the Scorpion. The court, armed with SOSUS data that would have detected such a fight, found that there was no evidence to support the theory of a battle loss. The court of inquiry that investigated the Scorpion's loss first considered the possibility of an underwater dog-fight between Scorpion and the Echo II sub. There was concern that the Soviet vessels might try to investigate or interfere with NATO underwater listening devices known as SOSUS which had been set up in that area. Included one Echo-II-class nuclear-propelled submarine, a submarine rescue vessel, two hydrographic survey ships, and eventually, a guided-missile destroyer, capable of firing nuclear surface-to-surface missiles, and an oiler. Naval Institute's professional journal (" Why They Called the Scorpion "Scrapiron," July 1998), on May 20, 1968, the Scorpion was ordered to intercept a Soviet flotilla near the Azores that
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